佛教与吠檀多
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中文
佛教与吠檀多
吠檀多（Vedanta）哲学是佛教以及印度一切学说的基础；但我们所说的近代学派的不二（Advaita）哲学，吸收了佛教徒的诸多结论。当然，印度教徒不会承认这一点——那些正统的印度教徒不会，因为在他们看来，佛教徒是异端。但确实存在一种有意识的努力，试图将整个教义体系加以延伸，以便将异端也包容在内。
吠檀多与佛教并无争执。吠檀多的理念在于调和一切。对于北传佛教徒，我们毫无分歧。但缅甸人、暹罗人以及所有南传佛教徒说，存在一个现象世界，并质问我们有什么权利在其背后创造一个本体世界。吠檀多的回答是：这种说法是错误的。吠檀多从未主张存在本体世界与现象世界两个世界。世界只有一个。通过感官来看，它是现象的；但它始终是本体的。看见绳子的人看不见蛇。要么是绳子，要么是蛇，而绝非二者并存。因此，佛教徒对我们立场的陈述——说我们相信存在两个世界——是完全错误的。他们有权说它是现象的，如果他们愿意的话；但他们无权主张别人没有权利说它是本体的。
佛教除了现象之外不想承认任何东西。唯有在现象之中才有欲望。是欲望在创造这一切。近代的吠檀多学者完全不持此说。我们说，有某种东西变成了意志。意志是被制造出来的东西，是一种复合物，而非"单纯体"。没有外在对象，就不可能有任何意志。我们看到，意志创造了这个宇宙这一立场本身就是不可能的。它怎么能呢？你可曾见过没有外在刺激的意志？欲望不可能在没有刺激的情况下产生，或者用现代哲学的术语来说，不可能在没有神经刺激的情况下产生。意志是大脑的一种反应，也就是数论（Sankhya）哲学家所称的"觉"（Buddhi）。这种反应之前必有作用，而作用又预设了一个外在宇宙。当没有外在宇宙时，自然就不会有意志；然而，根据你们的理论，正是意志创造了宇宙。谁创造了意志？意志与宇宙是共存的。意志是一种现象，与创造宇宙的那同一冲动所引起的。但哲学不能停留于此。意志完全是个人性的；因此我们不能赞同叔本华的观点。意志是一种复合物——内在与外在的混合。假设一个人生来没有任何感官，他就完全不会有意志。意志需要来自外部的某些东西，而大脑则从内部获得某些能量；因此意志是一种复合物，与墙壁或任何其他东西一样是复合物。我们完全不同意这些德国哲学家的意志论。意志本身是现象性的，不可能是绝对者。它只是众多投射之一。有某种不是意志的东西，却将自身显现为意志。这我能理解。但说意志将自身显现为一切其他事物，我就无法理解了，因为我们不可能有任何脱离宇宙的意志概念。当那个作为自由的东西变成意志时，它受到时间、空间和因果律的制约。且看康德的分析：意志处于时间、空间和因果律之内。那它怎么可能是绝对者呢？人不可能在时间之外进行意志活动。
如果我们能停止一切思想，那么我们就知道我们超越了思想。我们通过否定来达到这一点。当每一种现象都被否定之后，剩下的那个，就是"它"。它不能被表达，不能被显现，因为显现又将再次成为意志。
English
BUDDHISM AND VEDANTA
The Vedanta philosophy is the foundation of Buddhism and everything else in India; but what we call the Advaita philosophy of the modern school has a great many conclusions of the Buddhists. Of course, the Hindus will not admit that—that is the orthodox Hindus, because to them the Buddhists are heretics. But there is a conscious attempt to stretch out the whole doctrine to include the heretics also.
The Vedanta has no quarrel with Buddhism. The idea of the Vedanta is to harmonise all. With the Northern Buddhists we have no quarrel at all. But the Burmese and Siamese and all the Southern Buddhists say that there is a phenomenal world, and ask what right we have to create a noumenal world behind this. The answer of the Vedanta is that this is a false statement. The Vedanta never contended that there was a noumenal and a phenomenal world. There is one. Seen through the senses it is phenomenal, but it is really the noumenal all the time. The man who sees the rope does not see the snake. It is either the rope or the snake, but never the two. So the Buddhistic statement of our position, that we believe there are two worlds, is entirely false. They have the right to say it is the phenomenal if they like, but no right to contend that other men have not the right to say it is the noumenal.
Buddhism does not want to have anything except phenomena. In phenomena alone is desire. It is desire that is creating all this. Modern Vedantists do not hold this at all. We say there is something which has become the will. Will is a manufactured something, a compound, not a "simple". There cannot be any will without an external object. We see that the very position that will created this universe is impossible. How could it? Have you ever known will without external stimulus? Desire cannot arise without stimulus, or in modern philosophic language, of nerve stimulus. Will is a sort of reaction of the brain, what the Sânkhya philosophers call Buddhi. This reaction must be preceded by action, and action presupposes an external universe. When there is no external universe, naturally there will be no will; and yet, according to your theory, it is will that created the universe. Who creates the will? Will is coexistent with the universe. Will is one phenomenon caused by the same impulse which created the universe. But philosophy must not stop there. Will is entirely personal; therefore we cannot go with Schopenhauer at all. Will is a compound—a mixture of the internal and the external. Suppose a man were born without any senses, he would have no will at all. Will requires something from outside, and the brain will get some energy from inside; therefore will is a compound, as much a compound as the wall or anything else. We do not agree with the will-theory of these German philosophers at all. Will itself is phenomenal and cannot be the Absolute. It is one of the many projections. There is something which is not will, but is manifesting itself as will. That I can understand. But that will is manifesting itself as everything else, I do not understand, seeing that we cannot have any conception of will, as separate from the universe. When that something which is freedom becomes will, it is caused by time, space, and causation. Take Kant's analysis. Will is within time, space, and causation. Then how can it be the Absolute? One cannot will without willing in time.
If we can stop all thought, then we know that we are beyond thought. We come to this by negation. When every phenomenon has been negatived, whatever remains, that is It. That cannot be expressed, cannot be manifested, because the manifestation will be, again, will.
文本来自Wikisource公共领域。原版由阿德瓦伊塔修道院出版。